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巴菲特答股东问1(银行业1)
作者:减法君 来源:雪球时间:2018-06-07 10:22:00

周一,我把翻译组简单介绍给了大家,参考文章:巴菲特翻译组成立(附试译段落---高盛问题),每周三我们会发布一些成果。那本周三,第一期如约而至。我们先从银行业开始,由于篇幅关系,单个行业也会分成多篇发布。

由于组员大多数并非专业翻译,大家平时也有自己的工作和生活。我们能保证某个问答一人翻译,一人校对,整合的时候再做最终修改。其中难免会有错误,希望各位朋友可以见谅并指出。

第一期来源于buffettfaq.com,是2010年之前的部分问题,其中一些问题涉及金融危机。而众所周知巴菲特在金融危机后通过购买高盛和美国银行的优先股而大赚特赚。所以观察巴菲特对金融危机的看法,应该会有一些收获。


本期翻译的问题如下:

Are investment banks so complex that the head is not aware of the risks? (2008)

What do you think of the banking business model? (2002-2008)

You’ve recently invested in Goldman Sachs and GE. Is the financial sector a good buy right now? (2009)

How did you decide to invest in Salomon? (1998)

Is it true that Salomon almost caused a global financial crisis? (2006)

General Electric and Goldman Sachs: GE has a history of trying to manage earnings. Do you regard GE and Goldman as attractive businesses or attractive securities? (2009)


Are investment banks so complex that the head is not aware of the risks? (2008)

投资银行的复杂程度如此之高,以至于管理层也无法意识到风险?(2008)


翻译: 王志宽

校对: Zzz8zzz


WB: Exceptionally good question. The answer is probably yes in most places, though there are a few CEOs I respect a lot. Gen Re had 23,000 derivative contracts. I could have worked full time on that, and I probably still couldn’t have gotten my head around it all. And we had exposures that I thought were possible and heads of business units didn’t — I don’t want slim, I want none. I am Chief Risk Officer at Berkshire. If something goes wrong, I cannot assign it to a committee.

巴菲特:非常好的问题。虽然我非常尊敬一些CEO,但在大部分情况下,答案是肯定的(他们无法意识到风险)。通用再保险(巴菲特旗下的大型再保险公司)有23000份衍生品合同。就算我把全部时间都花在这上面,还是无法完全弄清楚。我们的某些风险敞口,我认为是存在的,但业务部门负责人不这么认为——(这个时候我会说)我不要(所谓的)低风险,我要风险为零。我是伯克希尔首席风控官。如果出了问题,我不能把责任推给委员会。


I think big investment banks and big commercial banks are almost too big to manage effectively in the way they have elected to run their business. It will work most of the time. You may not see the risk. A 1-in-50-year risk - it won’t be in the interest of a 62-year-old executive who is retiring at 65 to worry about it. I worry about everything. Many CEOs say they didn’t know about what was going on. It’s easier to admit he doesn’t know what’s going on than to admit that he knew what was going on and let it go on.

我认为大型投资银行和大型商业银行的规模太大,以至于无法按照预期的方式进行管理。(这些机构)大部分时间可以正常运营,但可能会忽视一些(可能性小但后果严重)风险。一个62岁还有3年就要退休的高官不太会操心50年一遇的风险。而我操心所有的事。许多CEO声称他们不知道发生了什么。承认不知道发生了什么,比承认知道发生了什么并让它继续下去更容易。


I’ve been asked for advice on regulation. Somehow, the press hasn’t picked up on this too much. OFHEO [Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight] supervised Fannie [Mae] and Freddie [Mac]—their activities had a public element, and were semi-regulated. For 200 people [at OFHEO] it was their sole job to examine the books. They were two-for-two with two of the biggest accounting scams in the history of the world. The person at the top must have it in their DNA to see risks. In many ways, there are firms that in terms of risk are too big to manage. If too big to fail, there are interesting policy implications.

有人向我征求关于监管条例的意见。不知何故,媒体对此并不关心。OFHEO [联邦住房企业监督办公室]监督房利美和房地美——他们属于公共事业,并被半监管。对于OFHEO的200多号人来说,监管两房几乎是他们唯一的工作。然而,史上最大的会计丑闻却在发生在两房。高管必须把风险管理意识刻在骨子里。某种程度上,一些公司因为规模太大而难以管理风险。所谓的“大到不能倒”,确实是个有趣的政策议题。


CM: It is crazy to allow things, which are run with knavery, to get too big to fail. As an industry, there is a crazy culture of greed and overreaching and overconfidence, trading algorithms. It is demented to allow derivative trading such that clearance risks are embedded in the system. Assets are all“good until reached for”on balance sheets. We had $400 million of that at General Re,“good until reached for”. In the drug business, you must prove it is good. It is a crazy culture, and to some extent, an evil culture. Accounting people really failed us. Accounting standards ought to be dealt with like engineering standards.

芒格:如果任由某项带有欺诈性质的业务变得“大到不能倒”,那么这个世界真是太荒唐了。这个行业(投资银行业)有着贪婪、过度自信、过度依赖算法交易的文化。让内含清算风险(清算时的交易对手风险)的衍生品交易市场过度发展是不理智的。(投资银行的)资产负债表上到处都是“金玉其外、败絮其中”的问题资产。我们的通用再保险有4亿美元的问题资产。在制药业,你必须证明某种药是有效的才可以上市(而在金融行业,一些金融创新产品只在理论层面经过检验就被广泛推广,之后也造成了严重的后果)。某种程度上说,这是一种疯狂且邪恶的文化。此外,会计师让我们失望了,他们对待会计准则本应该像(工程师)对待工程标准一样。


WB: Salomon [Salomon Brothers during the 1991 scandal] was trading with Marc Rich who had fled the country. They said they wanted to keep trading with him. Only by total directive could we stop it. I think the Fed did the right thing with Bear [Stearns]. They would have failed on Sunday night, and walked to a bankruptcy judge. They had $14.5 trillion of derivative contracts — not as bad as it sounds, but the parties that had those contracts would have been required to undo the contracts to establish the liability from the estate. With the $400 million at Gen Re, we had 4-5 years. At Bear, it would have been 4-5 hours. It would have been a spectacle.

巴菲特:所罗门在1991的丑闻中,曾经和逃亡他国的Marc Rich(嘉可能公司创始人,擅长商品交易,经历复杂)一直保持着交易关系。我们用命令的方式才制止了相关的交易。我认为美联储在贝尔斯登事件上做了正确的事情,贝尔斯登本可能会在星期日晚上破产(美联储兜底300亿,帮助摩根大通公司收购了贝尔斯登)。他们有14.5万亿美元的衍生品合同——虽然听起来不那么糟糕,但一旦破产,(贝尔斯登)的对手方会撤销那些合同并建立新的债务关系。我们有4-5年的时间去处理通用再保险的问题资产。而在贝尔斯登,只有4-5小时。如果真的能处理完,这会是一场奇观(暗示不可能)。


Two of the witnesses at the testimony said,‘we understood we couldn’t borrow unsecured, but we didn’t understand we couldn’t borrow secured.’The world does not have to lend you money. If they don’t want to lend you money, an extra 10 basis points won’t make a difference. It depends on people’s willingness to lend you money, which comes down to how other people feel about you. If you are dependent on borrowed money, you have to wake up every day worried about what the world thinks of you.

两位(贝尔斯登的)证人在证词中说:“我们明白自己无法获得无担保贷款,但我们不知道即使我们提供抵押品,也借不到钱。”这个世界没有借钱给你的义务。如果他们不想借钱给你,你额外支付10个基点(0.1%)的利息也不起作用。这取决于人们借钱给你的意愿,即是别人对你的看法。如果你依赖借贷度日,你每天醒来都要担心世界对你的看法。


Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2008 Boodell Notes

来源: 2008年伯克希尔股东大会Boodell笔记


What do you think of the banking business model? (2002-2008)

您对银行的业务模式怎么看?


翻译: 虹坤宇

校对: david


Banking is a good business - many banks earn high returns on tangible equity

巴菲特:银行业是门好生意——许多银行获得了不菲的有形权益回报(有形权益是指股东权益减去商誉和无形资产)。


“Charlie and I have been surprised at how much profitability banks have, given that it seems like a commodity business.”

考虑到银行业类似于大宗商品行业(同质化程度高),查理和我一直都很惊讶它竟有着如此的盈利能力。


Underestimated how sticky customers are and how unaware they are of fees banks charge them

(我们)低估了客户粘性,以及客户对银行收费的浑然不觉的程度。


WFC - $4.00 per share after full taxes on $15 of tangible equity

富国银行以15美元的每股有形权益产生了4美元的每股税后利润(暗示富国银行的有形权益回报率很高,达到26.7%)。

If you have a well run bank, you don’t need to be the #1 bank in an area

如果你的银行运营良好,你不必成为本区的头号银行(就能赚取不错的利润)。


Bank ROA is not highly correlated to size

银行的资产回报率(ROA)与规模并非高度相关。(通常来讲,ROA会随着规模扩大而减少)


You may have to pay 3x tangible equity to buy a bank

你需要花掉三倍于其有形股本的钱来买下一家银行。


Only problem with banks is that sometimes they get crazy and do dumb things...’91 was a good example

银行业唯一的问题是他们会时不时变得疯狂,做一些蠢事。1991年就是一个很好的例子。


If a bank doesn’t do dumb things on the asset side, it will make good money

如果银行在资产端不做蠢事,它就会获得可观的利润。


Source: Buffett Vanderbilt Notes

Time: Jan 2005

来源:巴菲特与范德堡大学学生问答实录

时间:2005年1月

(注:每年有几次,巴菲特会邀请美国商学院的学生来奥马哈座谈,名额有限,通常20人上下。这次是范德堡大学(又译范德比尔特大学)欧文商学院被抽中)


------------------------------------------------

We've been somewhat surprised at how well banks have done. Some have generated 20% or greater returns on tangible equity over many years, though this is in part due to increasing leverage.

对于银行业优异的表现,我们有点惊讶。虽然部分原因是由于杠杆的加大,但是有些银行有形资产收益率还是达到或者超过了20%


[CM: "We misdiagnosed it and, even worse than that, we haven't changed."

芒格:我们对银行的判读有误。但是更糟糕的是,我们还没有改变(暗示还会继续犯错)。


Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2002 Tilson Notes

Time: 2002

来源:2002年伯克希尔股东大会Tilson笔记

时间:2002年


Banking, if you can just stay away from following the fads and making bad loans, has been a remarkably good business. Since WW II, ROE for banks that have stayed out of trouble has been good. Some large well-run banks earn 20% ROE. I've been surprised that margins in banking haven't been competed away.

巴菲特:如果银行业能够不追逐所谓的热点、远离不良贷款,那这可以说是一门非常好的生意了。二战以来,没陷入困境的银行,其净资产收益率(ROE)都非常高。一些经营状况良好的大银行,净资产收益率可以达到20%。令我惊讶的是,银行业的利润率没有因为竞争而下降。


[CM: What you're saying is that we screwed up, because banking has turned out to be better than we thought. We made a few billion [dollars] from Amex while we misappraised it. My only prediction is that we will continue to make mistakes like that.]

芒格:你所说的正是令我们困扰的事情,因为银行的表现比我们预想的好。我们误判了美国运通,却挣了几十亿(美元)的利润。我唯一可以预测是:类似的错误还会继续。


It's pretty extraordinary that institutions competing against each other without real competitive advantages can all make high returns. Part of it is higher loan to value ratios than in past years. Some banks get into trouble making bad loans, but you don't have to.

巴菲特:奇特之处在于:在一个高度竞争的行业内,每家公司都没有真正的比较优势,但是所有人都可以获得高收益。部分原因可能是因为贷款/价值比率持续提高。有些银行会因为坏账陷入困境,但这是可以避免的。


Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2003 Tilson Notes

Time: 2003

来源:2003年伯克希尔股东大会Tilson笔记

时间:2003


Financial companies are more difficult to analyze than other companies. They can report whatever earnings they want – it’s an easy game to play. For banks, earnings depend on loans and the reserves set aside. It’s easy to change and manipulate the reserves.

巴菲特:与其它类型的公司相比,金融公司分析起来更困难。金融公司可以披露任何他们想要披露的利润数字——这不过是一个简单的把戏而已。对于银行,利润取决于贷款金额和相应的贷款减值准备金额,而贷款减值准备较容易被更改和操控。


With a company like WD-40 or a brick company, the financials are easy to analyze. But with financial [companies] it’s tough, especially when you throw in derivatives.

对WD-40公司或制砖公司一类的企业(制造业公司),财务分析较为简单。但是,对于金融公司,尤其是涉及金融衍生品的公司,财务分析则困难得多。


There were very high grade, financially sophisticated people who were on the boards of the GSEs [Government-Sponsored Enterprises, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac] and they were not negligent, but it’s very tough [to detect the shenanigans that went on].

有一些经验老道、精通财务知识的人在政府资助企业(如房地美和房利美)的董事会担任要职。他们并没有疏于职守,但是也很难发现假账。


Charlie and I were on the board of Salomon and Charlie was on the audit committee, and [it’s just impossible to evaluate thousands of transactions]. You’ll just have to accept that with insurance companies, banks and other financial companies – it’s just a more dangerous field to analyze.

查理和我都是所罗门兄弟的董事会成员,查理还是其审计委员会成员,但是评估成千上万笔交易基本是不可能的。你必须接受这个现实:对保险公司、银行以及其它金融公司进行财务分析的难度药大得多。


With GEICO it’s easier because the statistics are quite accurate – it’s short-tailed insurance. It’s not like asbestos.

对盖可的分析相对简单,因为相关的统计数据较为准确(车祸发生概率)——汽车保险属于短尾保险(短尾保险,指可借助数理模型进行较为准确度量的保险业务类别),不像石棉致病类保险(石棉致病的潜伏期可以达到20年以上,所以石棉致病类保险难以估算潜在赔付额,且赔付周期长,属于长尾保险)。


I wouldn’t fault the ratings agencies. Even the big-name auditors didn’t catch it.

这个事情也不能归咎于评级机构。有些假账,即使是知名审计师也无法发现。


[CM: Where you have complexity, by nature you can have fraud and mistakes. You’ll have more of that than in a company that shovels sand from a river and sells it. This will always be true of financial companies, including ones run by governments. If you want accurate numbers from financial companies, you’re in the wrong world.]

芒格:复杂性伴随着欺骗和错误。银行的情况比一些从河里捞砂子销售的公司复杂多了。这种现象在金融业非常普遍,包括由政府经营的金融公司。如果你想从金融公司得到准确可信的数据,恐怕不太可能。


Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2005 Tilson Notes

Time: 2005

来源:2005年伯克希尔股东大会Tilson笔记

时间:2005


[Q - Small regional banks - what would you look at before you buy?]

问题:对于区域性小银行—在买入前,你会关注哪些方面?


WB: It is hard to make a categorical decision about regional banks. So much depends on the character of the institution. It will be a reflection of the CEO you have. A bank can mean anything. It can be an institution that is doing all sorts of crazy things. The Bank of Commonwealth was an example. We owned a bank in Rockford, Illinois, run by Dean Aback—he would always run a super, sound bank. You should know the culture of the management and the institution before making the decision to buy a bank. We own Wells Fargo and M&T, but it doesn’t mean they are immune. But likely they are immune from institutional stupidity. There was a wise man that said there are more banks than bankers. If you think about that a while, you will get my point.

巴菲特:想要对区域性银行作出明确的投资决策很困难,很大程度上取决于各家银行的特性。这种特性可以反映在其CEO上。各个银行可能会大不相同。银行可能会做各种疯狂的事,比如澳洲联邦银行。(另外有一些银行则与之相反)我们拥有位于伊利诺伊斯州罗克福德的一家银行,由Dean Aback管理。Dean是一位优秀的、稳健的管理者。在买入一家银行前,你应该了解其管理层和企业文化。我们持有富国银行和M&T的股票。并不是说这些银行不会犯错,但是它们存在制度性风险的可能性较小。有位智者曾说:银行比银行家多。如果你仔细想想这句话,就明白我的意思了。


CM: The questioner is on to something. So many large banks have cast a pall over the entire industry. You are prospecting in a likely territory.

芒格:提问者可能嗅到了一些商机。很多大银行使行业蒙羞。但是你可能正在关注一个有前途的领域(区域性银行)。


WB: If you took the 20 largest and the 20 smallest banks in Florida, I don’t know if you could tell the difference.

巴菲特:在佛罗里达州的区域银行中,选最大的20间银行和最小的20间银行,我不确定你是否能看出它们的差别。


CM: It is a territory that has some promise.

芒格:(区域性银行)这是一个有前途的领域。


WB: That is a wildly bullish statement from Charlie. I may need to go start buying! [laughter]

巴菲特:这句话说明查理非常看好这一领域。看来我需要开始买入了![笑]


Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2008 Boodell Notes

Time: 2008

来源:2008年伯克希尔股东大会Boodell笔记

时间:2008


You’ve recently invested in Goldman Sachs and GE. Is the financial sector a good buy right now? (2009)

你最近投资了高盛和通用电气(2008年下半年,巴菲特先后买入了50亿美元的高盛优先股和30亿美元的通用电气优先股)。现在(2009年初),金融行业存在好的投资机会吗?(2009)


翻译: 富贵儿

校对: 减法君


No sector is a good buy unless you understand the business. However, I do believe that there is good value and great opportunity now in the financial sector because it is extremely unpopular. Sector’s themselves don’t make good buys, companies that are undervalued make good buys. You know how to value a business, you project the future cash flows discounted to present and buy with a margin of safety. The earnings prospects need to be greater than the current value. Anything that is unpopular is always great to look at. If I was getting out of school right now, I would take a look.

巴菲特:如果你不了解这门生意,任何公司都没有投资机会。然而,我确实认为,目前金融行业有很好的投资机会,因为它相当不被看好。金融行业本身并不构成投资机会,只有被低估的公司才算是投资机会。你(需要)知道如何为一家公司估值:测算未来的现金流并且将其折现,然后在有安全边际的前提下买入。盈利前景需要大于当前价值。任何在当下不被看好的行业/公司都值得一看。如果我现在是一名毕业生(不知道从哪下手),我会去研究不被看好的行业/公司。


Source: Q&A with 6 Business Schools

Time: Feb 2009

来源:六校访问联合问答

时间:2009年2月


How did you decide to invest in Salomon? (1998)

你是如何决定投资所罗门兄弟公司(Salomon Brothers)(巴菲特于1987年9月购买了7亿美元的所罗门兄弟公司的优先股)的?(1998)


翻译: 富贵儿

校对: 减法君


Salomon like I said, I went into that because it was a 9% security in 1987 in September 1987 and the Dow was up 35% and we sold a lot of stuff. And I had a lot of money around and it looked to me like we would never get to do anything, so I took an attractive security form in a business I would never buy the common stock of. I went in because of that and I think generally it is a mistake. It worked out OK finally on that. But it is not what I should have been doing. I either should have waited in which case I could have bought more Coca-Cola a year later or thereabouts or I should have even bought Coke at the prices it was selling at even though it was selling at a pretty good price at the time. So that was a mistake.

巴菲特:正如我所说的,1987年9月,所罗门兄弟公司给出的优先股股息率是9%。与此同时,道琼斯指数在这一年涨了35%,我们卖掉了很多股票并得到了很多无处可去的现金。我通常不会考虑购买投资银行公司的普通股,(但考虑到现金充裕并且优先股这种形式比普通股更为安全)我买入了所罗门兄弟公司的优先股。事后看来,我认为这是一个错误。尽管最后的结果还不错,但我不应该这么做。我本来有更好的选择:比如等一年后增持可口可乐;或者当时就增持可口可乐,即便可口可乐那时的价格并不便宜。总的来说,投资所罗门兄弟是一个错误的决定。


On Long-Term Capital that is—we have owned other businesses associated with securities over the years-–One of them is arbitrage. I’ve done arbitrage for 45 years and Graham did it for 30 years before that. That is a business unfortunately I have to be near a phone for. I have to really run it (arbitrage operations) out of the office myself, because it requires being more market-attuned because I don’t want to do that anymore. So unless a really big arbitrage situation came along that I understood, I won’t be doing much of that. But I’ve probably participated in about 300 arbitrage situations at least in my life maybe more. It was a good business, a perfectly good business.

(巴菲特此次访问学校的时间是1998年10月,当时正值长期资本管理公司(LTCM)破产。巴菲特曾经出价收购濒临破产的LTCM,虽然最终未能达成协议。他在此解释了为什么他会考虑投资LTCM)对于长期资本管理公司LTCM,(我们之所以会考虑投资),是因为多年以来,我们在证券相关业务上积累了很多经验,其中之一就是套利。我做了45年的套利,而格雷厄姆做了30年。但是这项业务有个缺点,就是必须不停的打电话。我必须亲自出马,因为它需要根据市场情况迅速调整策略。现在我不想再这样做了。除非出现我自己看得懂,又有很大利润空间的套利机会,我才会下手。我这辈子大概做了300桩套利交易。这是一门很赚钱的生意。


LTCM has a bunch of positions, they have tons of positions, but the top ten are probably 90% of the money that is at risk, and I know something about those ten positions. I don’t know everything about them by a long shot, but I know enough that I would feel OK at a big discount going in and we had the staying power to hold it out.

长期资本管理公司LTCM持有很多套利的头寸,前10名的头寸可能占据了90%的资金和风险。我对前10名的头寸是有一些了解。我虽然不晓得其中所有的细节,但是我确信我掌握的信息已经足够让我在收购价格足够低的情况下立于不败之地。


We might lose money on something on that, but the odds are with us. That is a game that I understand. There are few other positions we have that are not that big because they can’t get that big. But they could involve yield curve relationships or on the run/off the run governments that are just things you learn over time being around securities markets. They are not the base of our business. Probably on average, they have accounted for 1⁄2 - 3⁄4 a percentage point of our return a year. They are little pluses you get for actually having been around a long time.

(在套利交易中)我们的部分交易可能会赔钱,但在可控范围内。这是我懂得的游戏。我们还有一些规模不大的套利交易头寸,是因为套利交易本身的规模限制。那些头寸或涉及到收益曲线的关系,或跟不同时期发行的政府债券有关等等,如果你在证券业足够久,你就和会清楚其中的原理。套利交易不是我们的核心业务,平均大概占到我们年收益的0.5%到0.75%,算是长期投资中一点额外的惊喜吧。


One of the first arbitrages I did involved a company that offered cocoa beans in exchange for their stock. That was in 1955. I bought the stock, turned in the stock, got warehouse certificates for cocoa beans and they happen to be a different type but there was a basis differential and I sold them. That was something I was around at the time, so I learned about it. There hasn’t been a cocoa deal since. 40 odd years, I have been waiting for a cocoa deal. I haven’t seen it. It is there in my memory if it ever comes along. LTCM is that on a big scale.

我所做的第一个套利交易,是用一家公司的股票换取可可豆合约【附注1】。那是在1955年,我买入股票,并换取了可可豆合约,而股票和可可豆合约存在一些价差,所以我卖出可可豆合约后就完成了(我人生的第一笔)套利。我从这件事情中学会了套利。但从那以后,就没有出现类似的套利机会。40多年来,我一直在等待下一次的这样机会,但之后就再没发生过。长期资本管理公司(LTCM)本质上就是大规模的参与这样的可可豆套利交易。


Source: Lecture at the University of Florida Business School

Time: October 15th 1998

来源::1998年佛罗里达大学商学院讲座

时间:1998年10月15日


【附注1】可可豆套利交易

1955年,可可豆价格飙升。而Rockwood公司持有了大量的可可豆合约,如果Rockwood直接卖出合约,需要缴纳大量的利得税,所以就提出一个股票换可可豆合约的方案:投资者可以用市场价值34美元的股票换取价值36美元的可可豆合约。公司由此可以合理避税,而投资者又获得了2元的套利利润。

巴菲特不仅参与了此次套利,又进一步买入了公司股票(考虑到Rockwood公司的利润因为可可豆涨价而提升),最终回报丰厚。


Is it true that Salomon almost caused a global financial crisis? (2006)

所罗门兄弟公司(1991年濒临破产)几乎引发了一场全球金融危机,是这样吗?(2006)


翻译: 富贵儿

校对: 减法君


It’s hard to tell what will cause a crisis: who will yell fire, how many people will rush to the exits, etc.

巴菲特:很难评价一场(连锁)危机产生的原因:可能是大叫“起火了”的人,也可能是不断涌向出口的人潮。(这里将进入危机比作火灾)


Look at Long-Term Capital Management, or what happened to the junk-bond market in 2002. It almost closed. It was chaos.

看看长期资本管理公司LTCM,或者2002年垃圾债券市场的情况。当时市场几乎关闭。简直就是一场混乱。


In mid-August 1991, when we were at Salomon, on a Sunday we were within half an hour of seeking out a Federal judge and handing over the keys and filing for bankruptcy. The lawyers were drafting the bankruptcy documents. Fortunately, [the Treasury ruling that would have forced Salomon to seek bankruptcy protection] was reversed.

1991年8月中旬的一个周日,我们当时在所罗门兄弟公司,距离联邦法官要求我们交出钥匙,申请破产的时间只剩不到半小时。律师们正在起草破产文件。幸运的是,这一决议被推翻了(财政部关于迫使所罗门公司寻求破产保护的决议)。


But what would have happened if we’d filed? Coincidentally, Gorbachev was spirited away the same day [Monday, August 19] and the Dow was down a few hundred points. What would have happened when the markets opened in Japan if Salomon Japan couldn’t deliver securities, etc.? Plus, Salomon had a $600-700 billion derivative book.

但是,如果决议没有被推翻,会发生什么呢?巧合的是,戈尔巴乔夫在同一天(8月19日星期一)被带走,道指下跌了几百点。如果日本市场开盘的时候,所罗门日本不能提供证券,会发生什么呢?另外,所罗门公司还有价值6000-7000亿美元的衍生产品(可能存在隐患)。


Munger: It could have been absolute chaos. There’s a very interesting story, with an interesting moral. Nick Brady was Treasury Secretary at the time. He was a Berkshire shareholder because of his long relationship with the Chaces.

芒格:可能陷入绝对的混乱。这里有一个有趣的故事,以及一个有趣的寓意。Nick Brady是当时的财政部长。他由于和Chaces家族的长期关系,而成为了伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的股东。


[From Buffett’s 1991 annual letter:“Malcolm G. Chace, Jr., now 88, has decided not to stand for election as a director this year. But the association of the Chace family with Berkshire will not end: Malcolm III (Kim), Malcolm’s son, will be nominated to replace him. In 1931, Malcolm went to work for Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates, which merged with Hathaway Manufacturing Co. in 1955 to form our present company. Two years later, Malcolm became Berkshire Hathaway’s Chairman, a position he held as well in early 1965 when he made it possible for Buffett Partnership, Ltd. to buy a key block of Berkshire stock owned by some of his relatives. This purchase gave our partnership effective control of the company. Malcolm’s immediate family meanwhile kept its Berkshire stock and for the last 27 years has had the second- largest holding in the company, trailing only the Buffett family. Malcolm has been a joy to work with and we are delighted that the long-running relationship between the Chace family and Berkshire is continuing to a new generation.”]

[下面摘自巴菲特1991年的年报。Malcolm G. Chace, Jr., 现年88岁,决定今年不作为董事参加选举了。但Chace家族和伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的联系不会就此终止。Malcolm三世,也就是Malcolm的儿子Kim, 会被提名取代他(进入董事会)。1931年Malcolm进入伯克希尔精纺协会工作,该协会在1955年与哈撒韦制造公司合并,组成了我们现在的公司。两年后他成了伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的主席。1965年早期他的在任,使得巴菲特有限合伙企业能够买到他亲戚持有的关键数量的伯克希尔的股票,最终帮助我们实质性地控制公司。Malcolm的直系亲属一直持有伯克希尔的股票,在过去长达27年中,他们是仅次于巴菲特家族的第二大持有者。和Malcolm一起工作很开心,我也很高兴Chaces家族和伯克希尔的长期关系已经延续到了下一代。]


Munger: He [Nicholas Brady] knew about us and was following the story. He trusted you, Warren, and I think that mattered.

芒格:他(Nicholas Brady)了解我们,也一直跟进此事。他信任你,沃伦,我觉得这点很关键。


It was terrifying what could have happened that day.

(所罗门濒临破产)那天本来可能会发生可怕的事。


Buffett: Kim Chace, who I introduced you to earlier [at the beginning of the meeting, Buffett introduced all of Berkshire’s directors], his father introduced me to Nick Brady when I was in my 30s. [In 1991,] he was head of the Treasury and they had issued a death sentence to us [Salomon] that morning. Fortunately Nick reversed it. [Had he not, we would have filed for bankruptcy and] it would have been a case study for a daisy-chain type of panic.

巴菲特:Kim Chace,早些时候我向你们介绍过他(会议开始时,巴菲特介绍了所有的董事成员)他父亲在我30来岁的时候就介绍我认识了Nick Brady。1991年的时候,Nick是财政部长,那天早上他们判了所罗门死刑,所幸的是Nick后来推翻了判决。否则我们就得申请破产,那样的话就又多了一个连锁恐慌的研究案例了。


That was nothing compared to what would happen now. It’s not an experiment that you would want to voluntarily conduct, let’s put it that way. [Nervous laughter]

和现在的情况比起来,那实在算不了什么,这不是一个你想自愿参与的经历。请允许我这样来形容。(有点尴尬的笑声)


Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2006 Tilson Notes

Time: 2006

来源:2006年伯克希尔股东大会Tilson笔记

时间:2006


General Electric and Goldman Sachs: GE has a history of trying to manage earnings. Do you regard GE and Goldman as attractive businesses or attractive securities? (2009)

伯克希尔投资了通用电气和高盛(2008年下半年,巴菲特先后买入了50亿美元的高盛优先股和30亿美元的通用电气优先股)。通用电气一直有调节盈利的做法(而高盛在金融危机中涉及欺诈交易)。请问伯克希尔为什么会投资通用电气和高盛?是因为他们是好公司还是因为他们价格有吸引力?(2009)


翻译: 富贵儿

校对: 减法君


Buffett: A very substantial fraction of American businesses over the last 15 years have managed earnings. We felt good about the quality of the businesses and the quality of the managements, but it was primarily the terms of the GE and Goldman deals that made them attractive. There were no second sources to GE and Goldman. I know the GE and Goldman CEOs quite well and am very happy with the deals. We’ve done a lot of business with Goldman over the years.

巴菲特:过去15年里,调节盈利的美国企业不在少数(暗示调节盈利并非关键因素)。对于通用电气和高盛这两家公司,我们觉得它们的生意是好生意,管理层也很优秀,但最吸引我们的是这两笔投资的条件对我们特别有利(暗示价格是主要考虑因素)。除了伯克希尔,这两家公司都找不到其他实力雄厚的投资者(帮助他们渡过金融危机)。我了解这两家公司的 CEO,并且对两笔交易都非常满意。多年来我们和高盛做过很多生意。


Munger: There’s been a lot of criticism of investment banking, but Berkshire has gotten help [from] investment banks. We’re comfortable with these businesses.

芒格:虽然我们对投资银行的批评很多,但伯克希尔得到了投资银行的帮助。我们对这些业务很满意。


Buffett: We’ve bought I don’t know how many wind turbines from GE.

巴菲特:我们从通用电气那里购买的风力发电机不计其数。


Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2009 Bruni Notes

Time: 2009

来源:2009年伯克希尔股东大会Bruni笔记

时间:2009



作者:减法君
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